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NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL SERVICE 
EFFICIENCY, RESPONSIVENESS, EQUITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Abstract 
We examine the relationship between a range of New Public Management (NPM) practices 
and citizens’ perceptions of service efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness in 
English local governments. We find that public-private relationships have a negative 
relationship with citizens’ perceptions of all four dimensions of local service performance, but 
that an entrepreneurial strategic orientation exhibits a positive association with all four. 
Performance management is also likely to positively rather than negatively influence citizens’ 
perceptions of local public services. Further analysis revealed that the impact of NPM 
practices varies according to the level of socio-economic disadvantage confronted by local 
governments.  
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NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL SERVICE 
EFFICIENCY, RESPONSIVENESS, EQUITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Introduction 
The belief that large and monopolistic public bureaucracies are inherently inefficient was a 
critical force driving the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s. To 
reconfigure the state along more cost-efficient (and effective) lines, NPM protagonists 
recommended that the public sector be opened up to greater private sector influence (Hood, 
1991). This was to be achieved through the implementation of a panopoly of practices which 
reflected these arguments, ranging from the promotion of various forms of relationships with 
private firms, such as contracting-out or later partnerships, to the development of complex 
performance management systems and a customer service orientation. Although the high tide 
of the NPM phenomenon has arguably passed, the relationship between NPM practices and 
the performance of public organizations remains an extremely timely concern. In seeking out 
ways to cut back public sector budgets, governments are once again searching for tools and 
techniques that can enable public managers to deliver quality services at a lower cost. To date, 
however, scant research has actually examined the effects of NPM on multiple dimensions of 
public service performance within the same study. Still fewer focus on the effects of those 
practices on citizens’ perceptions of the achievements of local public services.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the effects of NPM practices vary for citizens’ 
perceptions of efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness. To answer these 
questions, we examine the relationship between selected NPM practices and citizens’ 
perceptions of the efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness of a sample of English 
local governments. These organizations represent an interesting test case for examining the 
impact of NPM. Firstly, the origins of many NPM practices lie in the recommendations of 
public choice theorists for the restructuring of local government (Boyne, 1998). Secondly, in 
the past twenty years, local governments in England have been subject to a wide-ranging and 
comprehensive programme of NPM-inspired reforms, such as compulsory competitive 
tendering, Best Value and Comprehensive Performance Assessment. In many cases these 
reforms have been forerunners for similar initiatives in other parts of the UK public sector and 
in other countries. Thirdly, although, historically, local governments in England have been 
amongst the largest in the world (John, 2010), there has been a shift towards larger local 
governments in Europe and elsewhere (Dollery & Robotti, 2008), making the English case an 
especially relevant one. In addition, by focusing on a single case we are able to benefit from 
measures that precisely fit the study setting and can control for several factors, such as 
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central-local relations and macro-economic cycles, which can be sources of unmeasured 
heterogeneity in cross-country designs (see Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2002). 
 
In the first part of the paper, we review the literature about the anticipated benefits (and costs) 
of NPM practices for public service performance. Next, we reflect upon how those practices 
might have a distinctive influence on citizens’ perceptions of local public services. In the 
following section, we introduce our data and methods. Our dependent variables are drawn 
from a large-scale national survey of citizens across England and our measures of NPM 
practices from a large-scale survey of managers in English local governments. All other 
independent and dependent variables come from secondary data sources. Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions modelling the impact of NPM on local service efficiency, 
responsiveness, equity and effectiveness are presented, before the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings are discussed in the conclusion. 
2. NPM and public service performance 
Despite the omnipresence of NPM-style innovations in public sector, few overall evaluations 
exist. A great deal of the criticism directed at NPM is inspired by ideological positions or 
incidents of seriously dysfunctional outcomes. A common failure in much of this research is 
the tendency to take reform announcements and reform rhetoric for real, without assessing 
whether a certain reform has actually taken place, let alone whether it has made any 
difference (Pollitt, 2002). Academics have repeatedly emphasised the need for evaluating 
NPM, and have provided models and frameworks for doing so (Wollmann, 2003). Empirical 
assessments, however, are scarce, which is surprising given NPM’s emphasis on evaluation 
and evidence (Peters & Savoie, 1998; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004). Where such evaluations 
exist, they have tended to focus on specific types of reforms in specific kinds of sectors, such 
as the effects of utility liberalisation on price and satisfaction levels (Brau, Doronzo, Fiorio & 
Florio, 2010), or the introduction of pay for performance (Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009). Other 
research has taken the opposite position, and has focused on macro-level results of NPM-style 
reforms on government outlays, employment etc. (Kettl, 2000; Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald 
& Pettigrew, 1996; Goldsmith & Page, 1997). There also is a substantial body of research 
using reform talk, rhetoric and policy as input for analysis (Gualmini, 2008; see also Gregory, 
2003). More remarkable, still, is the wide availability of non-scientific analyses, often 
(government) documents, masquerading as evaluations of NPM reforms, but without actually 
investigating anything in a rigorous or systematic way (Pollitt & Dan, 2011). At the local 
level, slightly more material is available (Kuhlmann, Bogumil & Grohs, 2008; Walker & 
Boyne, 2006).  
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An important challenge in evaluating NPM reforms is that many reforms have been labelled 
‘NPM’ reforms without actually being based on public choice diagnosis and solutions. In 
order therefore to assess the effect of the NPM, one needs to look at its constituting features 
and at the specific practices inspired by NPM ideas, such as performance management, 
working with the private sector, agencification, contractualisation of employment et cetera. 
This is the approach we take in this paper. 
Criteria for evaluating NPM 
Many evaluations have focused on just one type of reform effects, e.g. on prices or 
productivity, without at the same time also looking at other effects, such as e.g. equity (Pollitt, 
2002:281). It has been argued that certain positive outcomes of NPM reforms may have come 
at the cost of other effects (see e.g. the overview in Pollitt, 2002). The supposed trade-off 
between managerial efficiency and equity takes a central place in discussions about effects of 
reforms, both in general, and in a public sector context (see e.g. Le Grand, 1991; Okun, 1975; 
Lane, 2000).  
 
Whereas efficiency improvements featured prominently in the management discourse 
promoting NPM-style reforms, equity was initially mentioned less often. Where it was, equity 
was often used as an argument against implementing those reforms. NPM, it was claimed, 
would undermine solidarity and lead to services that mainly benefit vocal citizens through a 
focus on individual customers instead of one on universal service delivery. Criticism was 
especially levelled as specific NPM-related innovations such as outsourcing, privatisation, 
fee-based pricing and choice-based consumerism (see e.g., Le Grand, 2007 and Clarke, 
Newman, Smith, Westmarland & Vidler, 2007 for an overview). Unions feared more fragile 
employment conditions in public services as well as worse and less resilient services for 
citizens as a result (Bach, Bordogna, Della Rocca & Winchester, 1999). Yet, critics have also 
claimed that broad concerns about social justice and equity remain unproven, and the NPM-
style reforms may indeed in many cases have improved equity in service delivery (Harrow, 
2002). Other arguments would highlight the need for first strengthening market efficiency and 
expanding and reinvesting the surplus in order to deliver social justice. 
 
Improved responsiveness has also been one of the main objectives of NPM, through 
providing services that correspond to individuals’ wishes, and through improving customer 
friendliness. At the same time, critics argue that NPM-style reforms have stimulated the 
wrong type of responsiveness - a market-driven individualistic model of responsiveness, 
 COCOPS Working Paper No. 7 6 
rather than collective responsiveness - and may therefore be a threat to substantive democracy 
(Box, Marshall, Reed & Reed, 2001). 
 
Still, most empirical research with an explicit NPM focus has tended to assess efficiency-
related outcomes (see Andrews, 2010 for an overview), or general performance (Boyne, 
2003), with evaluations concentrating on equity being much less widely available, or framed 
in a critical rather than in more empirical terms. Evaluating effectiveness is even harder. 
Unlike assessments of efficiency, judgements about effectiveness require looking beyond 
matters of process and organisation and taking a long term view about the outcomes of a 
reform.  
 
In this paper, we argue that focusing on different effects of NPM simultaneously is a 
precondition for any evaluation study. Such a focus on different criteria and values in public 
service delivery corresponds to a wider tradition in the discipline to avoid monofunctional 
approaches to public services. Indeed, ‘public administration faces a serious and seemingly 
irresolvable problem in continually seeking to maximize the attainment of mutually 
incompatible values’ (Rosenbloom, 1983:219). Most authors in Public Administration have 
not attempted to reconcile these tensions, but have instead promoted this value competition to 
the core of the discipline. One well-known example is Hood and Jackson’s work in which 
they distinguished between three families of administrative values or doctrines, and the 
difficulty of achieving all standards of success at the same time (frugality, rectitude and 
resilience). In more concrete terms, savings, efficiency, robustness, adaptivity and fairness 
may not go very well together (Hood & Jackson, 1991). Indeed, ‘Administrative doctrines are 
often contradictory’ (Hood, 1991:18). Rosenbloom likewise contrast three different traditions 
in public administration, the managerial, the political, and the legal (Rosenbloom, 1983:219), 
each with their own logic and values. The managerial tradition emphasizes values such as 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; the political tradition is concerned with 
representativeness, responsiveness and accountability; and the legal tradition has due process, 
equity, and the safeguarding of individual substantive rights as criteria of success.  
Using citizen perceptions to assess reform effects 
Effects of (NPM-style) public sector reforms can be established in different ways. A large 
number of studies have relied on public officials’ and managers’ evaluations of reforms 
(Worrall, Cooper & Campbell-Jamison, 2000; Emery & Giauque 2003; Lægreid, Roness & 
Rubecksen, 2006; Christensen & Lægreid, 1999). The logic for using such self-evaluation is 
that officials, politicians and managers can be considered experts and have first-hand and in-
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depth knowledge of the changes that have occurred in their own organisation. Other studies 
have concentrated on changes in specific objective characteristics of public services, such as 
prices, waiting times, failure rates, and so on (see e.g. Kelman & Friedman, 2009).  
 
In this paper, we rely on citizen perceptions to evaluate the performance of local services. 
Using citizen perceptions has become increasingly common in public administration research 
to assess the performance of public services (Kelly & Swindell, 2003). Political research has 
been quite ambivalent towards using citizen opinions about government because citizens do 
not always appear to be well informed (Banducci, Karp, Thrasher & Rallings, 2008), and the 
relationship between improved government performance and more positive public perceptions 
is far from straightforward (Cowell, Downe, Martin & Chen, 2012; Van de Walle & 
Bouckaert, 2003). There is an active debate about the differences between using objective or 
subjective evaluations, or between agency- and citizen-generated data (Lauer Schachter, 
2010), and about content and methodological factors that determine these perceptions (James, 
2009; Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011; Van Ryzin, 2004). Yet, citizen evaluations have 
been proven to be quite useful and reliable to evaluate public services (Charbonneau & Van 
Ryzin, 2011; Van Ryzin, Immerwahr & Altman, 2008; Swindell & Kelly, 2000). An 
additional advantage is that using citizen perceptions is often one of the few ways available to 
assess service outcomes rather than service outputs. Using citizen perceptions also helps 
overcome some criticism about the artificial selection of sets of objective output and outcome 
indicators in models. Still, it would be incorrect to consider citizen perceptions as the ultimate 
performance evaluation, because citizens do normally not evaluate performance based on a 
full set of information, but use shortcuts or cues (James, 2011). Such cues, in the context of 
this paper, could be published performance data, star ratings or league tables. 
 
Yet, there is still also a more substantive reason for using citizen perceptions. This reason can 
be found in the very essence of the NPM philosophy. NPM-style reforms have from their very 
beginning been presented as reforms that would ultimately benefit citizens. NPM reforms 
were, therefore, not reforms with an internal orientation, but reforms aimed at making public 
services more responsive to the public’s needs. NPM adapts and the wider public choice 
movement regarded ‘old-style’ public services as services run to the benefit of rent-seeking 
politicians and bureaucrats (see e.g. Lane, 2000 for an elaboration). According to this logic, 
asking these politicians and bureaucrats how they would evaluate the reforms would thus 
make little sense. Likewise, using performance indicators established by public services 
themselves would impose the government’s logic onto citizens. One of the reasons to 
introduce market mechanisms in local services was precisely the presumed inability of public 
officials to really know what citizens want and value. Using citizen perceptions, therefore, 
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comes closest to what the NPM-philosophy itself would suggest as its main criterion for 
success. A further added advantage of using citizen perceptions is that, in effect, it illustrates 
that the trade-offs between the different values and effects of managerial practices in the 
public sector should be made with reference to citizens, whereas such choices are made by the 
policy-maker and researcher when ‘objective’ performance indicators are used.  
3. The impact of NPM practices on efficiency, responsiveness, equity end effectiveness 
Although evidence on the efficiency gains from NPM practices remains mixed (Andrews, 
2010) and there is little to suggest that they have enhanced the effectiveness or equity of 
service provision, policy-makers across the world continue to laud the merits of NPM. Is a 
commitment to NPM practices associated with gains across multiple dimensions of 
performance? More particularly, are the putative benefits of those practices, appreciated by 
the recipients of local public services? Evaluating the impact of NPM-style reforms requires a 
disaggregation of both reforms and effects into their constituent parts (Pollitt, 2002). In this 
paper, we distinguish between four types of effects, and we also look at the impact of 
different specific NPM-style reforms rather than at the effect of NPM as a whole. In selecting 
criteria for the evaluation, we follow Boyne, Farrell, Law, Powell and Walker (2003), who, in 
evaluating public management reforms in health care, housing and education, distinguished 
between three main criteria: efficiency, responsiveness and equity. We add effectiveness as an 
indicator of the likely long-term impact of NPM on citizens’ perceptions of performance. 
Based on the literature discussed above, we expect to find positive effects of NPM-style 
reforms on efficiency, responsiveness and effectiveness, yet negative effects on equity. We 
select six specific NPM practices: public-private relationships, performance management, an 
entrepreneurial strategic orientation, a strong customer focus, the extent of capital charging, 
and the use of temporary staff. The selection of practices is by no means comprehensive, but 
covers a substantial range of NPM-style reforms.  
4. Data and measures 
The units of analysis for our study are English local governments. These organizations are 
elected bodies, operating in territorially bounded geographical areas, which employ 
professional career staff, and receive over two-thirds of their income from the central 
government. They are multi-purpose governments delivering services in the areas of 
education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, public housing, leisure and 
culture, and welfare benefits. In England at the time of the study there were 386 local 
governments of five types. 32 London boroughs, 36 metropolitan boroughs, and 46 unitary 
authorities mostly in urban areas delivering all of the services listed above; and in rural areas 
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34 county councils administering education and social services, and 238 district councils 
providing welfare and regulatory services. Local governments are very suitable units of 
analysis because there are a relatively large number of units, and because the units are 
relatively homogeneous – especially compared to other public sector bodies. Data availability 
is a further reason why we have chosen to focus on local authorities. The relatively high 
degree of centralisation in the English system makes England fertile soil for research because 
of the quantity of comparative data this generates. 
Dependent variables 
To gauge citizens’ perceptions of the performance of local public services we draw upon 
measures from the Place Survey carried out by all English local governments in 2008, which 
asked respondents a series of questions about the quality of life in their local area. The survey 
was based on a demographically representative random sample of 1,100 residents in each 
local government. The data were collected by local governments using a standard 
questionnaire, independently verified by the Audit Commission (a central government 
regulatory agency), and later published by the Department of Communities and Local 
Government. The published figures show the percentage of respondents in each area agreeing 
with the survey statements.  
 
Efficiency To gauge citizens’ perceptions of the efficiency with which services are provided 
by local governments we draw upon a survey measure, which asked respondents whether they 
agree that their “local council provides value for money”. This captures the extent which 
service users are content with the price/quality ratio of the services that they receive, and so 
closely mirrors the classic definition of technical efficiency as a ratio of outputs over inputs.  
 
Responsiveness The responsiveness of local governments was tapped by utilising a survey 
question asking informants whether they had been “treated with respect and consideration by 
your local public services”. This captures how well local governments are meeting the 
personal expectations of service users. 
 
Equity Equity refers to how well public organizations are able to tailor service provision to 
meet the needs of the diverse groups of citizens that they serve. To gauge the extent to which 
citizens’ perceive the services provided by local governments to be distributed in this way we 
draw upon a survey item asking respondents to indicate if they agreed that local public 
services “treat all types of people fairly”.  
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Effectiveness Citizens’ perceptions of the overall effectiveness of their local government was 
measured by drawing upon a Place Survey question which asked respondents how satisfied 
they are with the way that their council “runs things”. This measure serves as a proxy for the 
extent to which respondents believe their local government is effective in performing its core 
tasks. 
Independent variables 
NPM practices Data on NPM practices were drawn from three sources: firstly, data on public-
private relationships, performance management, entrepreneurial strategy and customer focus 
were drawn from an email survey of managers in English local governments; secondly, 
financial statistics collected by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
were used to gauge the extent to which local governments had divested themselves of capital 
assets; and thirdly, the contractual status of local government employees was evaluated using 
public sector employment statistics collected by the Office for National Statistics ,  
 
The survey of local government managers was administered by email in late 2007 to the 
entire population of senior and middle managers in English local government. Multiple 
informant data were aggregated from senior and middle managers in each organization to 
overcome sample bias problems associated with surveying a higher proportion of informants 
from one organizational level (Walker & Enticott, 2004). The number of informants surveyed 
varied across each type of local authority due to the differing role and responsibilities of 
single and two-tier authorities. The total number of potential informants was 6,975, and the 
number of actual respondents was 1,082, yielding a response rate of 15.5 per cent. Responses 
were received from 28 London boroughs, 36 Metropolitan boroughs, 45 unitary authorities, 
31 county councils and 188 district councils.  
 
Since only governments from which there were responses from each of the two echelons 
(senior and middle management) were included in our analysis, some cases could not be 
matched when we aggregated these echelons up to the organizational level due to missing 
data. As a result, our statistical analysis of the relationship between NPM practices and 
citizens’ perceptions of public service performance was conducted on 175 (out of a 
population of 386) single and upper-tier local governments. To establish the 
representativeness of our sample, we tested for differences between included/omitted 
authorities by undertaking independent sample t-tests on our control variables. No statistically 
significant differences between our sample of local authorities and the population of local 
governments were found, indicating that our sample are representative of the population of 
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governments on key distinguishing characteristics such as deprivation, population, population 
density and age, ethnic and social class diversity. 
 
We draw upon three measures of public-private relationships to construct an index of 
commitment to the involvement of the private sector in public service provision. First, the 
extent to which local government’s contract services out to private sector providers was 
gauged by asking survey respondents to indicate on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) that their organization pursues “a policy of contracting out/outsourcing”. This 
provides a good proxy for the prevalence of contracting-out in the absence of published 
accounts of the proportion of services contracted out. Second, the extent to which local 
governments externalise service provision was gauged by asking respondents whether their 
organization pursued “a policy of externalisation”. Third, we asked respondents whether their 
organization “works in partnership with the private sector” to capture the variety of 
alternative arrangements with the private sector which respondents may associate with 
partnership-working (O’Toole, 1997). We then constructed an index of public-private 
relationships using principal components analysis, which demonstrates strong inter-item 
reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha (α) score of .73; see Nunnally, 1978). 
 
We measure the commitment to performance management using four survey measures. First, 
we asked respondents to indicate the extent to which their organization has “a well developed 
framework of clear performance measurement and targets”. Next, we invited respondents to 
rate whether “our management information systems enable the authority’s senior management 
team to judge progress towards meeting goals and targets”. We also asked whether the 
organization’s “management systems enable service managers to judge their progress towards 
meeting goals and targets”. Finally, we utilise a survey item, which asks whether the 
informant’s organization uses “rewards and sanctions to motivate staff (e.g. performance-
related pay)”. This gauges the extent to which managers are incentivised to enhance 
organizational performance. The index of performance management we construct also 
demonstrated strong inter-item reliability (α .73).  
 
We utilise two measures of an entrepreneurial strategic outlook, which reflect Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) classic definition of a prospector type of strategy i.e. one that is focused on 
innovation, and attempts to identify and develop new markets and services. The first question 
asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they believe their organization to be “at the 
forefront of innovative approaches”. The second asks them to rate whether “searching for new 
opportunities is a major part of our strategies”. These survey questions have been show to 
exhibit high scale reliability in several different settings, including English and Welsh local 
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government, Texas school districts and Danish schools. Nevertheless, on this occasion, they 
exhibit no more than an acceptable degree of scale reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.57). 
 
A single survey item is used to capture the customer orientation of each local government: 
“satisfying service users is a high priority”. This measure has strong face value as a proxy for 
the commitment of each local government to delivering more customer-focused services, 
which aim to meet citizens’ expectations.  
 
To gauge the extent to which the introduction of capital charging had forced local 
governments to rationalise their asset portfolio, we utilised figures indicating local 
government expenditure on capital charges per capita. This measure captures the relative size 
of the asset portfolio, with higher charges indicative of a larger asset portfolio and hence a 
lower commitment to the NPM practice of asset rationalization (Heald & Dowdall, 1999). 
 
The use of temporary employees by government has become ever more apparent in the wake 
of New Public Management reforms across the globe (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). The 
proportion of the staff in each local government employed on temporary contracts is therefore 
measured to capture this shift toward job insecurity in the public sector. This measure is also a 
proxy for the proportion of employees adhering to a transactional rather than a relational 
psychological contract which some commentators claim is characteristic of employment 
relations in the wake of NPM (Noblet & Rodwell, 2009). 
Control variables  
Seven measures were used to control for the effects of external circumstances, which may 
influence citizens’ perceptions of the efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness of 
local public service provision. First, we include the average ward score on the indices of 
deprivation in 2007. This is the instrument UK central government uses to gauge levels of 
socio-economic disadvantage in an area based upon a combination of: income, employment, 
health, education, housing, crime, and environment. Earlier research by Haubrich and 
McLean (2006) and Guttiérez Romero, Haubrich and McLean (2010) on English local 
authorities showed that the level of deprivation is negatively related to local government 
performance. We thus anticipate that areas with higher levels of deprivation will have 
correspondingly lower levels of citizen satisfaction with local public services. An alternative 
argument could be that in more deprived communities, expectations about local government 
performance are lower, and therefore perceptions more positive. Next, we include three 
measures of demographic diversity: age, ethnic and social class (see table 2 for further 
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details). The proportions of the various sub-groups within each of the different categories 
identified by the 2001 national census within a local authority area (e.g. ages 0-4, Black 
African, Small Employers and Own Account Workers) was squared and the sum of these 
squares subtracted from 10,000. The resulting measures give a proxy for ‘fractionalisation’ 
within an area, with a high score on the index reflecting a high level of diversity (see Trawick 
& Howsen, 2006). We expect that more diverse areas will evince lower levels of satisfaction 
with the performance of local public services because a commitment to public goods in 
general is often lower in such areas (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000: Andrews, Boyne, Law & 
Walker, 2005).  
 
Differences in citizens’ perceptions of local public services are also likely to arise from 
variations in the size of the population they serve. On the one hand, citizens may feel closer to 
or more involved in the service production of smaller local governments, and thereby evince a 
correspondingly positive perception of their efforts. On the other hand, local governments 
serving big populations can accrue economies of scale, and so may be able to invest more 
resources in improving service quality, which has a direct impact on citizens’ perceptions. 
The relative size of local governments was measured using population figures for each local 
area from the 2001 national census.  
 
Related to scale arguments, it is also suggested that public organisations in urban areas can 
reap scope economies by offering multiple services from the same site, though those in rural 
areas may be unavoidably constrained to do the same due to limited resources (Grosskopf & 
Yaisawang, 1990). In either case, it is possible that citizens are more satisfied with the quality 
and accessibility of multi-service provision, including the availability of a single contact point 
for all services, such as one-stop shops - though it also conceivable that they prefer separate 
dedicated contact points. Population figures were therefore divided by the area of each local 
authority to measure density.  
 
In addition, we enter a dummy variable coded 1 for district councils and 0 for all other 
councils to control for the possibility that smaller disaggregated administrative units are better 
placed to positively influence citizens’ perceptions because they are closer to the communities 
that they serve than larger units (Sharpe, 1970). This also captures the idea that the benefits of 
inter-organizational competition are more likely to emerge in smaller units of government 
(Boyne, 1996).1  
                                                     
1
 We also explored the potential effects of local government structure further by including a dummy variable coded 
1 for the two large county councils subject to disaggregation in the English local government restructuring that 
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The descriptive statistics and data sources for all our variables are listed in Table 1.2 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Min  Max S.D. 
Perceptions of efficiency 32.95 19.60 60.60 6.24 
Perceptions of effectiveness 44.87 27.60 70.30 7.13 
Perceptions of responsiveness 73.49 57.50 83.80 5.35 
Perceptions of equity 71.55 55.90 79.90 4.20 
NPM practices     
Contracting out 3.84 1.00 7.00 1.20 
Externalisation 4.08 1.00 7.00 1.30 
Partnership with the private sector 5.17 2.25 7.00 .95 
Framework of targets 5.88 3.50 7.00 .75 
Management systems assist senior 
management 
5.55 3.00 7.00 .86 
Management systems assist service 
managers 
5.29 2.50 7.00 .90 
Rewards and sanctions for staff 2.54 1.00 7.00 1.35 
Forefront of innovative approaches 5.06 2.50 7.00 .90 
Searching for new opportunities 5.47 3.50 6.83 .76 
User satisfaction a high priority 6.19 4.33 7.00 .56 
Capital charges per capita 46.49 -2.90 300.35 41.66 
Temporary staff (%) 11.78 .00 41.42 9.47 
Control variables     
Deprivation 2007 18.73 5.36 44.64 8.86 
Age diversity 2001 8725.68 8136.98 9463.16 108.80 
Ethnic diversity 2001 1775.98 280.42 8452.82 1705.95 
Social class diversity 2001 8758.59 8094.54 9007.01 83.37 
Population 2001 227885.30 34563 227885.28 235939.61 
Population density 2001  1527.16 37.91 11733.33 2082.54 
District council .50 .00 1.00 .50 
                                                                                                                                                        
occurred in 2008 and 0 for all other councils in the statistical models. Inclusion of this measure did not add 
anything to the explanatory power of the model or alter the direction or statistical significance of the other 
variables so it was excluded from the models we present in table 2.  
 
2
 Before running the models, skewness tests were carried out to establish whether each independent variable was 
distributed normally. High skew test results for population (1.85) and population density (1.76) indicated non-
normal distributions. To correct for positive skew, logged versions of these variables were created. 
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Data sources 
Place Survey 
 
Age diversity, ethnic 
diversity, population, 
population density, social 
class diversity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital charges 
Temporary staff 
 
Communities and Local Government. 2009. Place Survey 2008. London: 
Communities and Local Government. 
Office for National Statistics (2003) Census 2001, National Report for England and 
Wales. London: ONS. Age diversity comprised 12 groups: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 
20-24, 25-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85+. Ethnic diversity comprised 
16 groups: White British, Irish, Other White, White and Black Caribbean, White 
and Black African, White and Asian, Other Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, 
Other Asian, Caribbean, African, Other Black, Chinese, Other Ethnic Group. Social 
class diversity comprised 12 Socio-Economic Classifications: Large Employers and 
Higher Managerial Occupations, Higher Professional Occupations, Lower 
Managerial and Professional Occupations, Intermediate Occupations, Small 
Employers and Own Account Workers, Lower Supervisory and Technical 
Occupations, Semi-Routine Occupations, Routine Occupations, Never Worked, 
Long-Term Unemployed, Full-time Students, Non-Classifiable. 
CIPFA (2007) CIPFA Finance and General Statistics. CIPFA: London. 
Office for National Statistics (2007) Public Sector Employment Survey. ONS: 
London. 
5. Methods 
We draw on Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to control for the possibility that the 
error terms are correlated across separate regression models for different dimensions of 
performance. The error terms from four separate equations (for perceived efficiency, 
responsiveness, equity and effectiveness) are likely to be correlated for a variety of reasons, 
such as unmeasured explanatory variables or data imperfections. Thus, as Martin and Smith 
(2005:605) argue, “there is obvious prima facie relevance of methods to estimate systems of 
equations with correlated disturbance terms when analysing organisations that produce 
multiple outputs”. Separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equations for our dependent 
variables revealed the following: a near perfect correlation between the residuals from the 
models of perceived efficiency and effectiveness (.91), a very strong positive correlation 
between those from the models of effectiveness and equity (.65), and positive correlations 
ranging from .45 to .53 for the residuals for all the other models.  
 
In such circumstances, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is inefficient as separate estimations are 
unable to utilise relevant information present in the cross-regression error correlations 
(Zellner, 1962). SUR remedies this by determining the parameters for all relevant equations in 
a single iterative procedure. SUR regressions therefore give us coefficients for the 
independent variables in each separate equation that are purged of any association with the 
tendency of an organisation that does well on one dimension of performance to do well on 
another. We have, in effect, a “pure” model of citizens’ perceptions of efficiency, 
responsiveness, equity and effectiveness. 
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6. Results 
We present the results of our SUR regressions in the following sequence. Three models are 
presented in table 3: model 1 regresses the independent and control variables on to the 
measure of perceived efficiency; model 2 regresses the same variables on to the perceived 
responsiveness measure; model 3 on to the perceived equity measure; and model 4 on to 
perceived effectiveness. The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score for the 
independent variables in models 1-3 is about 1.8, with no measure exceeding 3.5. These VIF 
scores suggest the results in table 2 are not likely to be distorted by multicollinearity 
(Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990). White’s (1980) test revealed that the data are 
homoscedastic, so it was not necessary to correct for the presence of nonconstant error 
variance. 
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Table 2 NPM practices and citizens’ perceptions of efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness 
 Model 1 (efficiency) Model 2 (responsiveness) Model 3 (equity) Model 4 (effectiveness) 
Variable β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. 
Public-private relationships -1.134** .443 -.657** .271 -.657** .260 -1.368** .492 
Performance management .958* .494 .480* .302 .094 .290 1.239** .549 
Entrepreneurial strategy .706+ .510 .636* .312 .471+ .300 .872+ .567 
Customer focus .475 .823 .498 .503 .873* .484 .697 .915 
Capital charges .020+ .013 .010 .008 .002 .007 .014 .014 
Temporary staff .014 .047 .020 .029 .045* .028 .033 .052 
Controls         
Deprivation -.141* .059 -.354** .036 -.282** .035 -.304** .066 
Age diversity  -.007* .004 -.001 .003 -.003 .002 -.009* .005 
Ethnic diversity .0004 .0003 -.0004* .0002 .0003 .0002 .0006+ .0004 
Social class diversity -.014** .006 -.007* .003 -.013** .003 -.019** .006 
Population (log) -.606 .888 -.313 .543 .036 .522 -.1.432+ .987 
Population density (log) .755* .449 -.698** .275 .112 .264 1.215** .500 
District council 3.585* 1.589 -.034 .971 .411 .933 -.492 1.766 
         
Constant 208.400** 63.576 159.499** 38.844 214.802** 37.357 291.439** 70.660 
Chi2 statistic 67.08**  300.38**  142.41**  80.42**  
R2 .28  .63  .45  .32  
Notes: number of observations = 175. + p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests).  
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The findings in Table 2 indicate that our analysis uncovers a range of important statistically 
significant relationships between NPM and citizens’ perceptions of performance, and that our 
models explain between about 30% and 60% of the variation in those perceptions. In terms of 
our general expectations, we do not find that the model for equity is considerable different 
from the models for effectiveness, responsiveness and efficiency: the statistically significant 
coefficients in the equity model point in the same direction as in the other models. The model 
for responsiveness works best in terms of explained variance, though this is in large part due 
to the local authority characteristics captured in the control variables – something to which we 
return later.  
 
Turning to the results for the independent effects of the NPM practices, the most striking of 
our findings is that a commitment to public-private relationships is consistently associated 
with worse perceptions of local service performance. This directly contradicts the mantras of 
many NPM protagonists about the virtues of private sector involvement in public service 
delivery. However, it does reflect the evidence from a range of research which suggests that 
the involvement of the private sector in public service provision may lead to a deterioration of 
service quality due to high transaction costs and poor contract specification (e.g. Knapp, 
Hallam, Beecham & Baines, 1999; Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright, 2008).  
 
In contrast to our findings for public-private relationships, the table illustrates that a 
commitment to performance management is positively related to all but one of the measures 
of citizen satisfaction (equity). This evidence chimes with Boyne’s (2010) recent literature 
review, which established the goal clarity provided by performance management has a 
positive influence on public service performance. In terms of the absence of a link with 
equity, it is conceivable that the performance management and measurement systems used by 
English local governments at this time were less attuned to the equity with which services are 
provided, but were instead designed to improve the input/output ratio of service production, 
as well as the effectiveness of local service delivery.  
 
The results for an entrepreneurial strategic orientation indicate that it is positively related to 
each performance measure, thereby corroborating previous work on the benefits of actively 
seeking new ways of working in the public sector (e.g. Boschken, 1988; Andrews, Boyne, 
Law & Walker, 2011). However, the strategy measure exhibits a strong statistical influence 
only for the measure of responsiveness. This implies that local governments that pursue 
innovation and seek out new ways of working may be especially well placed to identify 
initiatives that are closely matched to service users’ needs.  
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The results in table 2 highlight that the other NPM practices we analyse have a much weaker 
overall relationship with citizens’ perceptions of performance. A customer focus has a 
positive influence on citizens’ perceptions of local public service equity; a finding that 
mirrors the private sector literature on customer satisfaction, which suggests there is a strong 
link between good customer care and perceptions of fair treatment (e.g. Bies & Moag, 1986). 
However, a customer focus appears to have no relationship with any other dimension of 
performance. A connection with equity is also revealed for the percentage of temporary staff 
employed by local governments. This may reflect the possibility that due to ‘anticipatory 
socialisation’ temporary employees sometimes exhibit higher organizational commitment 
than their permanent counterparts (McDonald & Makin, 2000). The finding may also be 
attributable to the likelihood that the temporary workers employed by local governments are 
often more representative of the full range of social groups within the local population (see 
Conley, 2011).  
 
Contrary to the prescriptions of protagonists of NPM accounting reforms, the maintenance of 
a larger capital asset base is positively associated with citizens’ perceptions of efficiency. 
Local citizens may regard a wide portfolio of assets as representing a better return for their 
taxes than a narrow and less visible one, especially as they are unlikely to be aware of the 
actual cost of maintaining that portfolio. However, capital charging has no observable 
relationship with any other performance measure.  
 
In terms of external influences on citizens’ perceptions of performance, we find that most of 
the control variables have the expected signs in each model, and in many cases are 
statistically significant. Deprivation and social class diversity, in particular, both exhibit a 
strong negative relationship with all four measures of citizens’ perceptions. Age diversity is 
negatively related to perceived efficiency and effectiveness, ethnic diversity to perceived 
responsiveness – though this variable is, somewhat surprisingly, positively related to 
perceived effectiveness. The size of local governments seems to make very little difference, 
but the density of the population appears to matter, with perceived efficiency and 
effectiveness higher in more densely populated areas, but perceived responsiveness lower. 
Finally, a positive connection with efficiency is also observed for the district council variable. 
 
Given the salience of deprivation for citizens’ perceptions of performance, we carried out a 
preliminary exploration of its potential influence on the relationship between NPM practices 
and performance, thereby giving due accord to Boyne et al.’s (2003) exhortation to consider 
the role of context in evaluations of public management reforms. We hypothesise that some 
NPM practices may prove more resource-intensive and complicated to implement in deprived 
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areas because those areas are plagued with more complex and intractable social needs, which 
seriously constrains the potential for citizens to participate in coproduction. In particular, we 
anticipate that those NPM practices that are externally facing, such as an entrepreneurial 
strategy, will be especially difficult to implement where coproductive capacity is weaker and 
will therefore be less likely to positively influence performance (Scott, 2002).  
 
To assess this possibility, we split the sample between local governments with above and 
below the median level of socio-economic deprivation (16.21) and re-ran our analysis. The 
results (available on request) confirm our hypothesis: the negative relationship between 
public-private relationships performance is stronger in more deprived areas and the positive 
relationship between prospecting and performance weaker. By contrast, the positive 
relationship between performance management, which is largely an internal facing practice, 
and performance is stronger in such areas. All of which illustrates, that the impact of NPM 
practices is at least partly contingent upon the organizational environment in which they are 
implemented. This is an issue that merits extended consideration in subsequent studies of the 
effects of NPM. 
7. Conclusion 
We presented arguments in this paper on the effects of NPM practices on citizens’ 
perceptions of four key dimensions of public service performance. These arguments were in 
some cases confirmed and in others contradicted through statistical analysis of citizens’ 
perceptions of efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness of a large sample of 
English local governments. We find that public-private relationships have a negative 
relationship with citizens’ perceptions of all four dimensions of local service performance, but 
that an entrepreneurial strategic orientation exhibits a positive (albeit weaker) association with 
all four. At the same time, performance management is also likely to positively rather than 
negatively influence citizens’ perceptions of local public services. We also find that these 
relationships are partly contingent upon the circumstances in which local governments 
operate, with externally facing practices proving likely to have fewer benefits than internally 
facing ones in organizations confronting more challenging socio-economic circumstances. 
These results have both theoretical and practical implications. 
 
The analysis expands on existing work on NPM and public service performance in at least 
three important ways. First, it tests for the impact of several important NPM practices. 
Previous quantitative studies have so far largely focused on the impact of a single practice, 
especially some element of public-private relationships (e.g. Amirkhanyan, Kim & 
Lambright, 2008). Second, the analysis draws upon m
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public service performance, whereas most extant research is focused solely on costs or 
efficiency (e.g. Hansen, 2010). Finally, by theorizing and empirical testing the possibility that 
the impact of NPM practices is contingent upon the organizational environment in which they 
are implemented, we offer a substantial extension of existing theory and evidence of the 
effects of NPM on performance, and illustrate how context matters for public service reform. 
 
Our analysis shows that public-private relationships seem to have few benefits for citizens’ 
perceptions of the performance of local public services (especially in more economically 
deprived areas), yet there are other NPM practices which do; in particular, performance 
management and (to a lesser degree in more deprived areas) an entrepreneurial strategy. 
These findings illustrate the complex and often contradictory nature of the impact of NPM 
practices, and point to the difficulty faced by public organizations subject to large-scale 
reforms comprising multiple new initiatives, such as the modernization programme imposed 
upon English local governments by the Labour government during the study period (Laffin, 
2008). The statistical results we present therefore provide considerable food for thought for 
policy-makers about the merits of specific targeted reforms versus whole-of-government 
approaches. They also indicate that there is a need to determine whether a given reform is 
likely to be a good fit for the context in which it is to be introduced. Our results suggest, for 
example, that performance management can be especially effective in socio-economically 
deprived areas, but that an entrepreneurial strategy may be ineffectual and public-private 
partnerships extremely detrimental.  
 
Another important consideration is how much discretion organizations can, do and should 
exercise over the priority accorded to different elements of a reform programme. For 
example, the local governments in our sample exhibit considerable variation across the six 
NPM practices, which we study, highlighting that, even in a centralized state like the UK, the 
implementation of central reforms at the local level is invariably uneven. Further qualitative 
and quantitative research could cast light on the extent to which adoption of alternative NPM 
practices is influenced by local managers’ and politicians’ interpretation of the social, 
economic and political needs of their locality. Such further research could also help to assess 
whether the findings can be generalised to other types of organisations or local governments 
in other countries. This would require controlling for the specific details of each NPM 
practice, and the implementation process of the practice. Indeed, it may emerge that it is not 
the presence of an NPM practice in itself that leads to certain perceptions, but the process 
followed for introducing the practice and the time since the practice has been implemented. 
More research is therefore required to identify precisely what types of management and 
organizational actions are associated with an apparent commitment to NPM practices.  
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Finally, the effects of NPM practices point in the same direction for all four dimensions of 
performance that we study. Contrary to much of the literature on the topic, this suggests the 
absence of an equity trade-off vis-à-vis other performance dimensions. Still, our statistical 
model provides a much stronger explanation of equity than of the other dimensions of 
performance. Thus, we conclude that, in the minds of citizens at least, the impact of NPM 
appears most likely to influence their sense of how fairly public services are delivered.  
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